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Abstract 
While a number of scholars argue that classical realism is conspicuously similar to critical 
international relations, this article takes an issue with such an interpretation. It does not 
challenge the observation that both approaches are comparable when it comes to ethical 
concerns and a related critique of modernity, but it puts forth an argument that they differ 
fundamentally when it comes to their basic intellectual motivation and purpose. This also 
makes classical realism more ready to formulate normative judgment. To articulate what 
provides for the ethical impetus in classical realism, the study turns to the work of Stephen 
Turner and his collaborators who illuminate Weberian sources of classical realist social 
science. Adopting the category of analyticism from Patrick Jackson, it further puts forth that 
normative judgment is linked to classical realism’s inherent ontological doubt, a feature it 
compensates for by focusing on epistemology necessitating constant engagement with 
empirical reality as a source of its (weak) ontological orientation. As a result, classical realism 
is reinforced here as an approach to international relations worth reviving and further 
developing. 
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Embracing Ontological Doubt: The Role of ‘Reality’ in Political Realism 
 
The social scientist is a part of history from which his knowledge is constructed;  
every tomorrow, that knowledge may have to be revised or abandoned altogether. 
WG Runciman (1963: 174)   
 
Introduction
1
 
The number of works revisiting IR’s classical realism which have appeared in the last dozen 
or so years is large enough to divulge that the once deprecated approach resonates with 
intellectual needs and quests of current IR scholarship. What exactly are the gaps that 
classical realism helps to fill in has so far not been systematically examined, although there is 
a number of partial accounts along these lines. Classical realism lends new energy and a 
particular direction to the theorising of the ethics of responsibility (Williams, 2005; Lebow, 
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2003), the virtue of reflexivity (Lebow, 2003), ethical leadership (Tjalve, 2008) or the need of 
a fundamental transformation of the state (Craig, 2003; Scheuerman, 2011). As can be seen 
already from this brief outline of its key themes, in its sensibilities, the revival of classical 
realism is conspicuously close to critical IR. It is, therefore, crucial to ask whether the 
classical realist revival is a part or a new stage of the critical turn in IR, which is both older 
and more robust than is the present turn to classical realism.  
 
Two issues may prevent us from reaching such a conclusion. First, it is the question of 
normative judgment. The promise of normative judgment seems to be stronger in classical 
realism than it is in critical IR, which is suspicious of normativity’s universalism. If classical 
realism is a version of critical IR, it must come to terms with the latter’s unease about 
normativity. Second, the renewed interest in the works of classical realists has not yet 
produced new research into contemporary international politics which would utilise classical 
realist theory.
2
 Unless such research is produced, one may ask whether the revival of classical 
realism is anything more than an antiquarian quest to engage past, oft-forgotten works of one-
time giants of our field, which – as is usually the case – lends a new perspective on what we 
are already set to do, strengthening our vision but without fundamentally challenging the way 
we do research. This article argues that the two points are crucially intertwined. By asking 
about the reluctance to produce new classical realist research in international relations, we 
may be able to answer the question how, if at all, classical realism is distinct from critical IR 
and where it grounds its commitment to normative judgment.  
 
Several commentators on the current revival of classical realism point out a striking similarity 
between the critical sensibilities of the key protagonists of this revival and the critical 
tradition in IR (Steele, 2007; Cozette, 2008a, 2008b; Hom and Steele, 2010).
3
 Some argue 
that it is the engagement with the work of classical realists as nurtured by contemporary 
critical sensibilities that produces what they call reflexive realism (Steele, 2007); others locate 
the very critical sensibilities in classical realism itself (Scheuerman, 2008). At the same time, 
there is also a growing unease with the idea that Morgenthau et al. should be seen as 
precursors of the critical turn in IR or even as critical IR theorists themselves. Daniel Levine 
(2013) makes a compelling argument why Morgenthau should not deemed a critical theorist. 
Compared to Frankfurt School’s anti-foundationalism, Morgenthau comes across as 
‘profoundly epistemologically and ontologically conservative’ (Levine, 2013: 96). Yet, we 
must ask whether admirers and critics alike assess classical realism on its own terms. After 
all, classical realism fell out of fashion and ceased shaping our scholarly receptiveness. It 
might well be that IR’s current the critical sensibilities as well as expectations on what is good 
scholarship are preventing us from recognising classical realism’s unique character and, 
concomitantly, from making full use of its own scholarly potential.  
 
Starting with the established premise that mid-century (now ‘classical’) realism lost to its 
competitors on the grounds of its alleged scientific inadequacies (Waltz, 1959; Gilpin, 1984; 
Vasquez, 1998: 41), the article’s first section examines the role of social science in both 
critical IR and classical realism. Within the context of this study, science is understood in 
Patrick Jackson’s (2011) pluralist sense, as a systematic inquiry to produce factual knowledge 
about the empirical world of international relations. The opening section emphasises the 
tendency in critical IR to neglect scientific inquiry, arguing that classical realism does not 
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 Rathbun (2008) illustrates why neoclassical realism cannot be seen as fulfilling this role. 
3
 For the purpose of this article, I understand the critical IR tradition broadly, including scholarship inspired by 
Frankfurt School Critical Theory, approaches developed out of the Coxian reading of Horkheimer as well as 
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have a comparable option of resorting to philosophy. While present scholarship has 
appreciated the specificity of classical realist take on social science, this has not been a key 
research area. This relative neglect is understandable. In the 1950s and 60s classical realism 
bitterly lost to the onslaught of behaviouralism, which triumphed as the more rigorous 
approach. It thus comes as no surprise that scholars working on the rehabilitation of classical 
realism have avoided repeating the mid-century battling. As a result, classical realism tends to 
be understood – and praised – as a kind of international political theory, which is exactly what 
its mid-century critics claimed it to be. To reverse this, the article turns its attention to 
classical realist social sciences, exploring in its second section the thesis that it is a version or 
precursor of IR constructivism before supporting the argument that it is best viewed as a 
Weberian social science relying on ideal-types. The third section reinforces this interpretation 
by exploring how Weberian social science necessitates cultivation of inner criticism as well as 
the faculty of judgment which indicates when the inner critic is (temporarily) satisfied. It is 
this faculty that informs the normative element of classical realism, one which looks 
conspicuously close to critical IR’s cultivation of ethics, but is in fact nurtured from different 
intellectual sources and practices of knowledge formation.      
 
1. Classical realism and critical IR: Morgenthau is not Adorno  
IR’s critical turn in the 1980s and especially 90s was instigated from two directions:  
scientific dissatisfaction with positivist IR that came to dominate the discipline and a longing 
for an ethical dimension in scholarship. IR was to be made ethical in the sense that analysis, 
its outcomes and the impact it is making on the social world was to be put under ethical 
scrutiny. This was married with a re-kindled belief that, in one way or another, ideas can 
produce a world better than the inherited one. Ensuing developments seem to have fulfilled 
both needs. Critical IR responds to scientific critique of un-reflexive, rationalist positivism 
and validates the ethical need by accounting for the power that knowledge brings about. 
However, as already some of the earliest critics point out, critical IR is rarely capable of 
satisfying its two intellectual roots – the scientific and the ethical – at the same time. Critical 
IR’s resignation on furthering its scientific dimension cannot be replicated in classical 
realism. Morgenthau, whom this study uses as an epitome of classical realism, was a social 
scientist and an IR scholar, unlike the seminal figures of critical IR who were all philosophers 
and often not particularly interested in international relations. 
 
While directly focusing on only one segment of the wider category referred to here as critical 
IR, Beate Jahn maintains that the Anglo-American strand of critical theory in IR sees ‘the 
epistemological critique of the fact-value relationship not as a basis for a more rigorous 
methodological approach than positivism, but rather as a licence of not observing any kind of 
rigour’ (1998: 614). According to Jahn, critical IR is complacent about honing its own 
scientific credentials. Instead, it seeks to build bridges between various theories and 
incorporates ‘valuable parts’ of realism, rationalism and idealism in areas it cannot provide 
for with its own theoretical means (1998: 626). Jahn worries that methodological laxity 
cannot be counterbalanced by a noble ethical goal, joining here another critic, Josef Lapid 
(1989).  
 
Critical IR has not displayed any systematic engagement with challenges of this kind. Mark 
Neufeld puts forth an argument why this is next to impossible (1995: 125). Critical IR seems 
to have acted upon Neufeld’s point. Instead of investing energy into theorising critical social 
science of international relations, it has placed extra effort into theorising its ethical 
commitments and philosophical significance. For many critical IR scholars this translates into 
non-normative cultivation of ethics, such as the ethics of scholarship as political action or the 
4 
 
ethics of responsibility, which do not make claims of normative universalism (Jabri, 1998; 
Edkins, 1999, 2000; Dauphinée, 2007). Others embrace commitments to political norms and 
related research interests (Linklater, 1998) but progressively do so in a rather abstract, though 
no less vehement, manner which stops short of formulating a specific normative position on 
current international affairs, focusing instead on long-term ethical orientation (Linklater, 
2011). It should be added that this dual shift away from social science and towards ethics 
might not have been propelled by only autochthonous forces. Most likely, it also happened as 
a response to the hyper-scientism that came to dominate global IR, which did not leave much 
space for alternatives as scientifically acceptable options. Toni Erskine is right to liken the 
status quo of current IR to ‘trench warfare’ or, at best, see it as profound ‘indifference’ 
towards other approaches (2012: 449). Jackson’s quest (2011) to re-configure the parameters 
of what is ‘good’ scientific IR demolishes the trenches but, as will be shown later, 
inadvertently reinforces critical IR’s reasons for turning away from its science.  
 
Another strategy, present in critical IR from its very beginning, is to postulate that scientific 
explanation is inherent to only some approaches – those which critical IR rejects as 
insufficient. Interestingly, Richard Ashley (1981) turns to John Herz and Hans Morgenthau to 
introduce this point, a move that might also make him into a forerunner for the more recent 
recovering of classical realism. Inspired by hermeneutics, Ashley distinguishes knowledge as 
understanding and knowledge as explanation and postulates that not all IR must be concerned 
with scientific explanation (1981: 212). In a sense, he celebrates the trenches Erskine 
criticizes. The book Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Hollis and Smith, 
1991) sealed Ashley’s thesis and in the eyes of many theorists brought the discussion about 
the alleged scientific inadequacy of critical IR to a closure. As a result, critical IR’s 
‘emancipatory interest’ (Ashley, 1981) and dedication to the politically excluded (George and 
Campbell, 1990) has most forcefully shaped our present expectations on and our very idea of 
what critical IR stands for.  
 
In many ways, the revival of classical realism replicates the trajectory of critical IR. Emphasis 
is placed on classical realism’s ethical commitments while scientific aspects are mostly 
neglected; preference is given to in-depth interpretations of past thinkers over engagement 
with contemporary theory and practice of international relations. The close attention paid to 
Hans Morgenthau over the last dozen years (Lebow, 2003; Williams, 2005, 2007; Tjalve, 
2008; Neacsu, 2009; Jütersonke, 2010; Scheuerman, 2013; Rösch, 2015) is not dissimilar to 
the attention seminal philosophers have received within critical IR. Like critical IR, the 
revival of classical realism highlights the problems of late modernity, especially ethical and 
political consequences of global value neutrality in the face of differentiated histories, of 
technological progress and environmental degradation. However, one factor in classical 
realism prevents its revival from mimicking the route of critical IR. From its very beginning, 
critical IR has been crucially nurtured by the philosophical works of Marx, Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Habermas, Foucault, etc. That none of these primarily sought to explain 
international relations has presented critical IR with a challenge which has been turned into an 
opportunity. It allows critical IR to avoid confrontation with the wider discipline on the issue 
of its science by constantly renewing its ethical orientation and critical diagnostics of the 
maladies of the modern world in the robust philosophies which underpin it. This avenue is not 
present for the revival of classical realism. 
  
Jackson identifies ‘reflexivity’ as the chief characteristic of critical IR, meaning by it 
‘reflexivity of knowledge, by which the tools of knowledge-production are turned back on the 
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situation of the scientist herself or himself’ (2011: 157).4 He argues that better understanding 
of reflexivity should make critical IR acceptable as a form of social science, if we define 
science broadly, as ‘systematic inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge’ (24), one with 
‘internal validity’ (22) and a ‘goal’ to pursue science (18). His aim is to show that critical IR 
is an approach scientifically on par with neopositivism, critical realism and what he calls 
‘analyticsm’, each representing a scientific possibility in Jackson’s two by two analytical 
framework. Yet, Jackson’s analysis could lead to a different conclusion. Accentuating 
‘reflexivity’ as the key feature in critical IR can also illuminate how this approach is 
constantly pulled away from the goals of social science (systematic factual knowledge), 
towards the humanities, especially philosophy. If one’s central intellectual concern is about 
the relationship of the self to knowledge, philosophy is the most rewarding intellectual home. 
It is illustrative that the focal point of Jackson’s chapter on ‘reflexivity’ is a discussion of 
Kant, Hegel, Horkheimer and Adorno rather than of various critical IR theorists grappling 
with the attraction of philosophy but primarily engaging in empirical research.   
 
Critical IR’s escape to philosophy can be illustrated with recent attempts to reinvigorate this 
approach through closer engagement of Adorno’s work. Levine (2012: 226) rebuts the rather 
well-known arguments by theorists like Habermas, Seyla Benhabib or Ira Katznelson that 
‘Adorno’s work led to a scholarly-theoretical impasse’. But his, admittedly philosophically 
attractive, defence of Adorno bypasses these critical arguments by vacating the realm of 
social science and concentrating exclusively on the realm of philosophy; that is on gaining 
intellectual satisfaction solely from the organization of one’s own thought rather than, as the 
social sciences would do, from (also) making sense of the minds/actions of others. Adorno 
criticized conceptual theories for reifying the ideas, practices or values they describe and 
replaced concepts with constellations. Levine characterizes constellations as having the ability 
to ‘continuously reveal the concepts and theories they bring together as nodes embedded 
within dense, interactive nets of social meanings’ (103). Their advantage over conceptual 
theories is that they ‘would surround events and problematics with voices that represent as 
many different parties to it as possible’ (104). But a constellation never seeks to privilege any 
of these parties or assign truth to some but not all of these voices. In this sense, constellations 
come across as means of saving a self-reflective mind from the guilt of assigning meaning, 
order or preference, each of which could be later proven wrong or unjust. But this happens at 
the cost of abandoning the possibility of making any intervention/change beyond the realm of 
one’s own mind. It is then not surprising that those attracted to the rewards of philosophy find 
those critical IR scholars who still want to contribute to the social sciences as insufficiently 
‘critical’ (see Levine, 2012: Chapter 2). From an exclusive perspective of philosophy, they are 
right.   
 
No such recourse to philosophy is available to classical realism. Admittedly, political realism 
has long intellectual roots (Dyson, 2007), some of which are philosophical, but there are no 
specifically ‘realist’ philosophers to draw on. This should not come as a surprise. Classical 
realism or – in the words of its mid-century adherents – political realism was first and 
foremost a means to theorising international relations. Engaging with the political reality of 
international affairs was always superior to philosophical questions about the nature of 
knowledge or the relationship between the self and the world, even if such questions had to be 
engaged while pursuing one’s endeavour. Morgenthau sees the purpose of his Politics among 
Nations (1
st
 ed. 1948) – and by extension of IR (or ‘international politics’ as he calls it) – as 
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‘to detect and understand the forces that determine political relations among nations, and to 
comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon each other and upon international 
political relations and institutions’ ([1948]1959: 14). ‘[T]his purpose is not misplaced’, he 
adds, because ‘the natural aim of all scientific undertakings is to discover the forces 
underlying social phenomena and how they operate’.     
 
Interestingly, Jackson’s robust plea for scientific pluralism omits classical realism – most 
probably because he seeks to address the diversity of present-day IR and does not consider the 
revival of an old approach significant enough to warrant inclusion. Morgenthau et al. serve 
Jackson as a foil to illustrate how throughout the history of IR ‘the term “science” has been 
flung around in extremely cavalier ways’ (2011: 3), citing the above quoted segment from 
Politics among Nations ([1948]1959: 14) as a prime example. Despite his lacking interest in 
classical realism, Jackson astutely observes that Morgenthau (and Carr) pursued a ‘double 
intellectual operation: on one hand criticizing the over-reliance on science … on the other 
hand, claiming some of its cultural prestige for his own project of knowledge-production’ 
(2011: 4). I will argue that this was not a calculation but an expression of a very particular 
understanding of social science which both reinforces its role and seeks to come to terms with 
its limits. As I will later demonstrate, classical realism is, in fact, an excellent example of 
Jackson’s category of analyticsm and, if understood as such, Jackson’s typology can help us 
to make better sense of its present utility.        
 
The mid-century realists’ conception of social science was challenged in what disciplinary 
history calls the Second IR Debate. Some present scholars question the very notion of a 
debate, arguing that there was little actual debating (Schmidt, 2013: 18). As Nicolas Guilhot 
(2008) demonstrates, the mid-century realists – together with other ‘traditionalists’, most 
notably the English School – fought hard to guard the study of international relations from the 
pressures of behaviouralism and concomitant modelling of the social sciences on natural 
sciences. The ‘methodological plea for science’ (Farr 1995, 202) was a chief trait of 
behaviouralism, an approach that entered the study of politics from other social sciences. But 
the realists did not seek to be anti-scientific, neither did they see themselves as enemies of 
science. What they maintained was that in order to understand (international) politics we must 
avoid reducing all behaviour to political agents’ rational choices and come to terms with the 
fact that actors, especially those in power positions, respond to a host of impulses, including 
moral and emotional ones. While rejecting a particular version of social science, the classical 
realists nevertheless insisted on reinforcing IR as science. In Guilhot’s formulation, the issues 
the realists disagreed about with their behaviourist colleagues were ‘the role of values and the 
problem of the rationality of politics’ (2008: 285). Importantly, the realists produced book-
length treatises as well as shorter pieces attacking scientific (and moral) rationalism in general 
well before the latter permeated the study of politics. Morgenthau’s Scientific Man versus 
Power Politics (1946) and Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) are best 
examples here.   
 
Their critics rarely challenged classical realists’ science directly or systematically. In fact, 
neither side in the Second Debate formulated what exactly is wrong with the alternate 
position. The two oft-cited articles (Bull, 1966; Kaplan, 1966) are exceptions. Texts from the 
time when the traditionalist-behaviouralist dispute was alive disclose that those on the 
behaviouralist side did not consider themselves as competing with the traditionalists. As is 
nowadays rarely stressed, the early anti-traditionalists did share the normative (essentially 
liberal) commitments of their traditionalist counterparts (Farr, 1995: 202); however, they did 
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not consider it scientifically sound to link explanation with normative evaluation.
5
 They 
claimed to be interested in the same social phenomena as the traditionalists but be using 
‘different’ – in the sense of being more sophisticated – ‘tools’ for their analysis. In fact, they 
sought to ‘destroy the traditional-behavioral dichotomy’ (Zinnes, 1968: 259, 266; see also 
Easton, 1957: 111-2) and strengthen thus IR’s scientific credentials. Destroy they did, though 
not in the manner that many of them seemed to have intended. Political realism was pushed 
out of the realm of social science. 
 
Karl Deutsch, a key figure in IR in the 1950s and 60s, usually labelled as an opponent of 
traditionalism while professing his own, cybernetic version of scientism not easily equated 
with behaviouralism, referred to classical realists sparingly. But when he did, rather than 
criticizing them, he associated them with political theory and the history of ideas, not with IR. 
To Deutsch (Deutsch and Rieselbach, 1965: 144), the works of Morgenthau and Kenneth 
Thompson are of value, but belong to the same category as the political philosophies of Leo 
Strauss and Sheldon Wolin – two giants of political theory of their time. In another place 
(Deutsch, 1967: 98), Morgenthau, Niebuhr, George Kennan and Thompson are placed within 
a wider, Augustinian and Thomist, intellectual tradition set apart from the ‘scientific’ spirit 
informing contemporary IR.  
 
Kenneth Waltz, credited with sealing classical realism’s defeat by directing IR toward 
approaches that fulfil the scientific aspiration of the early behaviouralists without succumbing 
to their mechanistic generalisations about human behaviour, also began with a normative aim 
(Craig, 2003: 118). Nevertheless, like some of his behaviouralist predecessors, he soon 
inserted a wedge between his normative commitments and his social science. The young 
Waltz also stands out by directly challenging classical realists, addressing them as the 
quintessential ‘first image’ theorists, reducing Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Herz to pessimistic 
theorists based on ‘basic assumptions’ about evil human nature and the impossibility of 
international peace (1954: 31). Like other proponents of scientific IR, he argues that classical 
realists are producing ‘a philosophy of politics’ (37), but not a science of IR. Elsewhere he 
suggests that without being ‘more concern[ed] with the structure’ the classical realists cannot 
achieve their scholarly aims (1960: 259).  
 
If the present revival of classical realism neglects the scientific dimension and presents this 
approach as chiefly a contribution to the ethics and philosophy of international relations, it 
can – inadvertently – replicate Deutsch’s, Waltz’s and other early opponents’ position. But, as 
this section demonstrated, unlike critical IR, classical realism cannot find external, 
philosophical sources that would bestow it with internal certainty and external legitimacy. 
What nurtures it is the production of systematic factual knowledge of international politics 
and not philosophical reflexivity. If the present revival of classical realism is to ever be more 
than an antiquarian pursuit or an exercise in selective inspiration, classical realism’s specific 
understanding of social science needs to be articulated. If nothing else, classical realism’s 
promise of producing normative knowledge, a pursuit that is otherwise scarce in 
contemporary IR and which is found problematic in critical IR, makes this effort imminent. 
 
2. The science of classical realism  
Political realism at one point dominated IR because of its scientific advancement. Morgenthau 
distinguishes realist IR from its idealist alternatives by criticising idealism’s ‘vagueness and 
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eclecticism of the theoretical conception’ ([1959]1962: 115). He does not challenge idealist 
ethical commitments and appreciates the virtues of idealist ethics. The alternative to idealism 
needs a specific intellectual ‘function’, one that Morgenthau defines in significant part in 
scientific terms. IR needs to ‘bring order and meaning into the mass of unconnected material 
and to increase knowledge through the logical development of certain propositions 
empirically established’ ([1961]1962: 72). Revealingly, while the scientific function has been 
largely absent in the classical realist revival, every comprehensive work revisiting the 
classical era of realism in IR devotes considerable space to at least some scientific elements. 
To the degree that the revival of classical realism has directly addressed questions of scientific 
theorizing, it has most often been in connection to social constructivism. However, as this 
section seeks to demonstrate, it is more productive to turn to the works that emphasise Max 
Weber’s legacy in realist social science and classify classical realism as an example of what 
Jackson calls analyticsm.   
 
One of the earliest contemporary interpreters of classical realism, Richard Ned Lebow, 
primarily seeks to show that ‘ethical behavior is more conducive … to national security’ 
(2003: 16). He does so by exploring the works of realist thinkers through the prism of what he 
calls ‘the tragic vision’, which should ‘widen [the] intellectual and emotional horizons in a 
manner conducive to political tolerance and reconciliation’ (24). At the same time, he 
repeatedly points out that the tragic vision urges the classical realists under his scrutiny, 
Thucydides, Clausewitz and Morgenthau, to prefer a certain kind of social science over 
others. This social science is according to Lebow closest to what we call thick constructivism 
(370) and resonates more closely with some anthropologic and sociological traditions than 
with much of present-day IR (311). It gives explanatory role to the realm of the arts and 
humanities, maintaining that the wealth of stories, parables, norms or emotionally testing 
genres such as Greek tragedy amass socially relevant knowledge about actors being ‘neither 
egoistic nor autonomous’ but cooperative because responding to ‘internal imperatives’ (311).  
 
Drawing on the political theorist Richard Flathman’s idea of wilful liberalism (1992), Michael 
Williams, another key protagonist of the classical realism’s revival, reads realism as crucially 
characterised by ‘wilfulness’. Flathman introduces the term to emphasise a specific, publicly-
orientated voluntarism as essential for sustaining freedom and free-spiritedness, that is, values 
and practices crucial to liberalism (1992: 123). Williams mobilises this term for similar 
reasons and maintains that realism is not opposed to liberalism, it ‘is a form of liberalism’ 
(2005: 130). He especially addresses Morgenthau’s critique of what could be called rationalist 
or schematic liberalism rather than the liberal order as such (83). Williams, too, links this 
point to a discussion of IR as a social science and, like Lebow, he brings in constructivism to 
argue the point. While scientifically acceptable, the constructivist critique of rationalism as 
empiricist epistemology and materialist ontology is mistaken in ascribing the reasons for these 
shortcomings. They are not a result of ‘somewhat naïve and anachronistic understanding of 
science and knowledge’ but must also be understood as ‘a set of practical commitments and 
as the outcome of practical judgments’ (149). A rationalistic actor can be seen as a particular 
‘identity’ (147).  
 
Samuel Barkin most directly addresses the idea that classical realism and IR constructivism 
are fundamentally linked and that constructivism viewed through the prism of classical 
realism is a valuable addition to IR theorising. This thesis not only allows Barkin to reorient 
constructivism but also to illuminate some scientific aspects of classical realism, although his 
interest is too instrumental and his insights into classical realism too conventional to consider 
him a party to the revival of classical realism. Barkin is right to emphasise that classical 
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realists were interested in power by ‘definitional fiat’, not because they wanted to reduce all 
international relations to power struggle (2003: 327). Equally useful is his reminder that for 
classical realism ‘power is at least partially endogenous’ and not exclusively materialist (329) 
and that ‘nonmaterial factors are central to a complete understanding of power in international 
relations’ (330). These and similar proto-constructivist points about classical realist ideas on 
the role of states and rationalism allow Barkin to claim that realist constructivism is a 
conceivable theory, sanctioning his reorienting of constructivism from its usual liberalist and 
idealist underpinnings.  
 
Lebow, too, is sceptical that Barkin’s thesis helps to illuminate the scientific merits of 
classical realism and its potential applicability for studying international relations here and 
now (Jackson et al., 2004). While agreeing that (some of) classical realists were ‘interested in 
questions that are often considered the preserve of constructivists’, he maintains that there are 
separate realist and constructivist paradigms which sometimes ‘fit together to help solve a 
large puzzle’ and sometimes do not (Jackson et al., 2004: 346). Others, most notably Patrick 
Jackson and Daniel Nexon, are less conciliatory and accuse Barkin of losing the grasp of what 
is commonly understood as constructivist IR (Jackson et al., 2004: 337-41). Whether Barkin 
is right on constructivism or not is unimportant here. What matters is that his thesis only 
works if classical realism is understood as an old-fashioned, unsophisticated, more intuitive 
than thought-through approach which got some things right and can now crucially reorient IR 
constructivism away from idealism. It is constructivism which possesses the advanced 
methodological tools of intersubjectivity and co-constitution; classical realism is crucially 
silent on the questions of subjectivity and objectivity or the agent-structure problem.   
 
In order to answer the question whether classical realism has specific answers to the questions 
that constructivism addresses with help of inter-subjectivity and co-constitution – or whether, 
as Barkin suggests, it is in need of imports from constructivism’s own answers to fill in the 
gaps – we are well served by looking at how classical realists sought to articulate their social 
science in response to the critique by their own contemporary, Raymond Aron. Aron was an 
idiosyncratic scholar, who according to Stanley Hoffmann single-handedly established French 
IR (1985). Hoffmann was a relentless commentator on the works of mid-century realists, 
especially Morgenthau, and recognised closed affinities between the American realisms and 
Aron (2002: 107), which were later reasserted (Cozette, 2004; Hassner, 2007). More than 
anything else, the similarities and differences between Aron’s and Morgenthau’s realism 
puzzle Hoffmann (1985). Like his American counterparts, Aron aspired to produce a 
complex, general theory of international relations. But his IR also encompasses a typology of 
international systems and a theoretical account of systems’ interactions, which brings him 
closer to systems theorists like Deutsch or Morton Kaplan. Deutsch and Kaplan approved of 
Aron’s work, Deutsch doing so in the very piece in which he classifies the American realists 
as nothing but political philosophers. He recognises Aron for ‘combin[ing] the insights of the 
great traditions – including both a concern for ethics and a continuing interest in such 
concepts as the balance of power – with sociological considerations’ (Deutsch and 
Rieselbach, 1965: 144). For Kaplan, Aron is a ‘honorable exception’ among the 
traditionalists, as his ‘remarkable writings are surely useful to political scientists and [his] 
methodology may not be quite so far removed from the newer scientific approaches’ (1966: 
16). However, Aron’s persistent emphasis on the distinctiveness of international relations, on 
the importance of historical analysis and on the relevance of power politics disclose 
fundamental affinity with the American realists. 
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Morgenthau recognises that Aron produces what we might call a pragmatic position on truth, 
yet he argues that such a position inevitably loses ‘precision, certainty, and predictability’ 
(1967: 1110). This leaves Aron with a fissure between his theoretical framework and what 
Morgenthau considers to be exceptionally insightful substantive propositions resulting from 
‘the author’s practical judgment’ (1111). Morgenthau maintains that Aron stops short of 
answering some of his own, well-formulated questions about international politics because he 
would have to acknowledge that his own theory is ‘standortgebunden’, that is ‘aris[ing] out of 
a concrete political situation with which it tries to come intellectually to terms in a new and 
meaningful fashion’ (1111). ‘Standortgebundenheit’, sometimes translated as social 
determination or context-dependency of knowledge, is a concept Morgenthau appropriates 
from Karl Mannheim (Behr, 2013: 763; Rösch, 2013: 822). Yet, Aron is hostile to the idea of 
theory’s ‘Standortgebundenheit’, as he is critical of Mannheim in general, maintaining that 
the sociologist pushed German historicism ‘to its extreme conclusion’ and thus fell into 
‘thorough-going historical relativism’ (1957: 56, 55). Aron, too, knows that a ruling on 
Mannheim’s contribution is what differentiates him from his American counterparts. When 
criticizing them he mobilizes another of Mannheim’s key terms, ideology. He berates the 
American realists for producing an ideology rather than a theory, with Niebuhr being their 
chief ‘ideologist’ (Aron, 1966: 592).  
 
Aron’s point has deeper roots, stretching to his long-standing grappling with German 
sociological tradition, especially with its quest to make sense of historical character of 
knowledge, in response to Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophical insights. His chief target is not 
Manheim but Max Weber. Like Morgenthau, Aron seems to be temperamentally at ease with 
‘ambiguities, uncertainties, and risks’ (Morgenthau, 1967: 1110) which characterise 
sociological historicism, but he worries that the German tradition of historical sociology, 
which seeks to operate in ‘a historical situation in which man has lost the certitudes which he 
believed unassailable and must create his own individual life within a collectivity whose 
destiny opens upon the unknown’ (Aron, 1957: 135), eventually cannot live up to its 
commitments to openness and ends up in either relativism or ideology.  
 
If Aron grapples with Weber, Morgenthau embraces the German social theorist, a point that in 
response to Morgenthau’s admission of early Weberian influence on his intellectual 
development (Morgenthau, 1978) has been repeatedly highlighted (Pichler, 1998; Barkawi, 
1998; Turner, 2009, Lebow and Lebow, 2016). The chief obstacle in this effort is the fact that 
Morgenthau rarely referred to Weber and his declaration of Weber’s influence in his 
intellectual autobiography came as a surprise. The explanation is historical and sociological. 
Like most emigres from Germany, Morgenthau had a hard time establishing himself in the 
US. It was a strategic decision not to disclose the German origins of his ideas (Rösch, 2015: 
148). Instead, Morgenthau ‘adopted a procedure that permitted him to present his Weberian 
views with their full polemical force, without the disability of their origins’ (Turner and 
Factor, 1984: 169). While some analysts find clear Weberian influence already in Scientific 
Man vs. Power Politics (Turner and Factor, 1984: 169–70); it is Morgenthau’s late works that 
most closely correspond to his autobiographic admission. The book Science: Servant or 
Master? (1972)
6
 can (and should) be read as a sequel to Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ and, 
more generally, as an engagement with the same questions about the value and meaning of 
science as have traditionally been explored in German sociology.          
 
                                                     
6
 See Rösch 2016 on the German origins of this book. 
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Not only does Morgenthau borrow from Weber some of his central concepts, he also 
replicates Weber’s methodology. As the Weberian specialist, sociologist and philosopher, 
Stephen Turner and his co-authors demonstrate (Turner, 2009; Turner and Factor, 
[1984]2014; Turner and Mazur, 2009), Morgenthau’s methodology can be made intelligible 
when interpreted as fundamentally Weberian. Because of the aforementioned emphases on 
classical realisms’ ethical dimensions, current IR scholarship typically glides over the precise 
mechanism of Morgenthau’s methodology or illuminates only some of its parts. Turner and 
George Mazur distinguish Weberian ‘clues’ that are central to Morgenthau’s IR as a theory of 
social science. The first clue relates to Weber’s argument that the social sciences are ‘value-
relative in at least two ways’ (Turner and Mazur, 2009: 487). One is similar to Mannheimian 
‘Standortgenbundenheit’ (the importance of which for Morgenthau is analysed in Behr, 2013 
and Rösch, 2013), another relates to our ‘disciplinary purposes’ and guides ‘the process of 
selection relevant to the study of international politics’ (Turner and Mazur, 2009: 487). In 
brief, what we study cannot be separated from the value this study has for us.  
 
Secondly, Weber’s concept of the rational ideal-type allows Turner and Mazur to explain 
Morgenthau’s alleged conflict between his claim that there are laws governing international 
politics and his interpretive social theory focusing on individual acts of especially statesmen 
(488–90). Morgenthau does not directly mention ideal types but his references to ‘rational’ 
properties of e.g. foreign policy and to the quality of ‘one-sidedness’ provide conclusive 
evidence of the use of Weberian ideal-typification. Morgenthau’s notion of rationality, Turner 
and Mazur argue, makes sense only if understood in the Weberian sense and not in the 
positivist sense of predictivity. The rational ideal-type is one-sided because it selectively 
presents only some – idealized – aspects of the studied phenomenon ‘for the purpose of 
making them fully intelligible by redescribing them in terms of clarified concepts’ (490). As a 
result, IR theory cannot produce the laws of politics; theory can only ‘reflect’ – imperfectly – 
these laws, which are intrinsic to the ideal type (492). The rationality of the ideal-type is tied 
to valuative nature of social knowledge, a point which Turner and Mazur illustrate, but do not 
sufficiently comment on, when they cite Morgenthau’s claim that ‘[w]e assume that statesmen 
think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that 
assumption out’ (Morgenthau, 1978: 5, cited in Turner and Mazur, 2009: 491). The ‘we’ in 
‘we assume’ gives expression to the social character of knowledge, to ‘rational idea-type of 
action’ (Turner and Mazur, 2009: 491). The collective assumption embodies what the social 
group values as the rational purpose of their action in that particular sphere of activity.  
 
Turner and Mazur’s third Weberian clue is the idea of separate spheres of human activity, the 
distinctiveness of the political sphere and its link to a normative element. This clue is the most 
challenging to demonstrate as the relationship between the idea that politics is a distinct 
sphere of social action and the normative element is at best tenuous in Weber. Turner is not 
keen to turn Weber into a normative sociologist and he cannot be accused of not knowing 
where Morgenthau departs from Weber. Together with Regis Factor (1984) he outlines a 
number of points of departure, but when it comes to Morgenthau’s departure from Weber on 
the desirability of normative judgment, Turner and Factor diminish the difference between 
Weber and Morgenthau and present this a ‘practice-informing theory’ that is ‘possible without 
departing from the Weberian strictures against normative theory’ (1984: 174). As will be 
shown in the next section, the ‘practice-informing theory’ is better referred to as normative 
judgment. When it comes to the concept of separate social spheres and the idea that 
separatedness of politics is related to normativity, Turner and Mazur (2009) suggest that 
Morgenthau succeeds in better conceptualising what Weber outlines but does not fully 
elaborate. If it ‘is not clear what status Weber wishes to grant these “spheres”’, for 
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Morgenthau they clearly represent ‘a condition of rational orderliness of a particular kind, but 
not that they represent intellectually closed universes’ (Turner and Mazur, 2009: 494). Turner 
and Mazur conclude that this methodology allows Morgenthau to both make human 
behaviour intelligible by being able ‘to understand agents who act in the face of contingency 
and systematic irrationality’ and – ‘if they act rationally … and they not always do’ – to 
predict actors’ behaviour (495).   
 
Turner and his collaborators present a more sophisticated interpretation of classical realism as 
a social science than can be done by likening it to IR constructivism. They not only manage to 
show that classical realist social science is fundamentally Weberian, but also that this 
approach is legitimate and fruitful. Weber is not nowadays ordinarily understood as a key 
figure in IR, although some early IR constructivists refer to him as a ‘precursor’ to 
constructivism’s position on power (Hopf, 1998: 177). It is Jackson who puts forth an 
argument that Weber is a ‘theorist par excellence’ (2011: 114) for one of the four modes of 
inquiry he distinguishes as making up the plurality of scientific approaches in contemporary 
IR. He calls this approach ‘analyticism’, to emphasise that it is ‘analytically general claims’ 
and not ‘empirical generalizations’ that constitute the key form of knowledge for this type of 
inquiry (Jackson, 2010: 4). Like constructivism, analyticism stresses intersubjectivity of 
knowledge. Unlike constructivism, however, analyticism does not work with the idea of co-
variation, as it does not make sense once empirical generalizations are not possible.
7
     
 
Interestingly, the only IR theorist whom Jackson identifies as an analyticist is Waltz. It may 
now be argued that Morgenthau is as good, if not better, an example. In the Weberian fashion, 
Morgenthau is not interested in empirical generalizations and IR theory that compares to 
reality, but in producing a ‘set of more or less helpful idealizations or oversimplifications that 
can be used to order the complex chaos of empirical reality into more comprehensible and 
manageable forms’ (Jackson, 2011: 113). What then distinguishes classical realism 
(analyticism) from critical IR (reflexivity) is a different take on the relationship between 
knowledge and observation. Critical IR operates with the idea of ‘unobservables’ (37), which 
is based on a meta-theoretical claim that ‘because these unobservable objects cannot be 
perceived … [they] are “concept-dependent”’ (89). That is, there has to be a theory informing 
the researches about the basic ontology of the world, what is studied is provided by theory 
prior to the act of studying. Analyticism, in turn, is phenomenalist. This means that for 
classical realism it is ‘neither necessary nor possible’ to ‘transcend experience’; knowledge ‘is 
a matter of organizing past experiences as to forge useful tools for the investigation of future, 
as-yet-unknown situations’ (37). As I will argue in the next section, analyticism thus has 
ontological doubt inscribed into its very scientific DNA. This doubt does not push it away 
from social science, into philosophy, but, just on the contrary, closer to it, to incessant 
analysis of the empirical world. And its forward looking purpose compels it to normative 
judgment.      
 
3. Embracing ontological doubt  
Classical realist Weberian IR enables understanding of singular phenomena. It allows for 
partial (and rather infrequent) prediction of action to the extent it is rational according to ideal 
rationality of the social sphere in which it takes place. It also seeks normative judgment of 
what would be the best (rational) action in a given situation and which values would be best 
to activate. One dimension which Turner et al. do not explore is the fact that this kind of 
                                                     
7
 Constructivism does not figure as an example of any of the four ideal-typical modes of inquiry Jackson 
recognises.  
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theory requires constant engagement with empirical reality. They helpfully point out that the 
ideal-type upon which Morgenthau developed his theory ‘was linked to a specific historical 
situation and role, that of the politician and diplomat concerned with national interest’ (495). 
But what happens to the value of knowledge this approach produces when, after over sixty 
years since its inception, we may well doubt the empirical relevance of ‘the politician and 
diplomat concerned with national interest’? Moreover, the historicity of Morgenthau’s ur-
ideal-type makes us ask a crucial epistemological question: What exactly made Morgenthau 
identify this type as an ideal in the first place? Why did not he choose war, the phenomenon 
of international anarchy or that of international cooperation, as competing theories do, or the 
phenomenon of continuous quest for power and dominance, which too is close to 
Morgenthau’s heart, and which other alternatives favour? In brief, we must question the 
assumption that Morgenthau starts with a robust ontology, while understanding the specificity 
of his – quite robust – epistemology. 
 
Jackson questions contemporary IR’s preoccupation with ontological clarity, which is 
typically expected to come before epistemological and methodological work (2011, 26–32). 
This, too, might be a consequence of the behaviouralist victory six decades ago. In 
Morgenthau this order of preference does not apply. He is concerned with methodology and 
epistemology, leaving ontology rather unattended and underdeveloped. In Weberian social 
science, theorising from an ideal-type, ontology does not have a primary role. Jackson, too, 
leaves the question of the selection and construction of an ideal-type unaddressed. Yet, when 
asking about present applicability of past theorising, as this article does, criteria for choosing 
an ideal-type in a particular historical constellation must also be articulated. Of help are here 
two theorists from outside of IR: the political theorist Judith Shklar, who asked questions of 
this kind, perhaps because she was primarily focusing on normativity of knowledge and 
grappled with the ossifying tendencies of ontology more directly than the IR scholars, and the 
historical sociologist WG Runciman. 
    
A political theorist sceptical about philosophical foundationalism, Shklar turns to socially 
produced knowledge to provide crucial orientation for her normatively oriented political 
theory. Believing that in the first place political theory must focus on the plight of those who 
suffer from domination (which she conceptualises as a wider category of cruelty), Shklar 
proceeds in a Weberian fashion, getting inspiration from Weber’s interpreter Runciman. What 
differentiates Runciman from his life-long object of study is a quest to primarily account for 
social change without escaping Weberian historicist framework. In his monumental three-
volume work, Treatise on Social Theory, Runciman seeks to develop a general theory of 
social change through the course of world history, akin in ambition to Michael Mann’s, in IR 
better known, project Sources of Social Power. In the first, methodological volume, which 
interests us here, Runciman outlines a tripartite methodology of knowledge-production: 
reportage, explanation and description. Runciman’s method prompts Shklar to call the study 
in which she praises it vis-à-vis its interpretativist alternatives ‘Squaring of the Hermeneutic 
Circle’ ([1986]1998).  
 
Shklar recognises that crucial to ‘full understanding’ is Runciman’s element of reportage. 
Among others, reportage faces the challenge of psychology, that is of answering the question 
‘what motivates social agents’; yet, does not have access to any such psychology – or even an 
idea of it (89). The rationality of a social sphere can serve as a proxy here. People want to 
succeed when acting in individual social spheres, thus co-constituting their rationalities. 
Runciman reiterates Weber’s claim that the reported event must be narrow enough to be 
confined to a social sphere with intrinsic rationality, so that rationalities of different spheres 
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do not contaminate knowledge production. An event must be ‘typical enough’ in Weberian 
sense (Runciman, 1983: 77); revolution, for instance, is too broad. Unlike Weber, Runciman 
devises a complex theory of selecting events for ‘ideal-types’. Reportage is not a one-off 
exercise. It ‘must be admitted to cover at least some cases of multiple occurrence’ and thus 
produce what he calls a generalization (106). Generalizations might be possible without pre-
empting other stages of knowledge formation – explanation and description/evaluation – and, 
crucially, they can be ‘allowed to stand or fall … by the criteria of reportage alone’ (107). 
Runciman continuously invites the figure of a hypothetical ‘rival observer’ to question 
whether a report is not ‘inaccurate’ or does not ‘involve a misunderstanding’. He thus 
implants historical particularism, the possibility to generalize and transfer reports of events, as 
well as scepticism about the validity of such transfers into the very act of reportage. Since 
reportage supplies for the primary ontological orientation of Runciman’s epistemologically 
and methodologically sophisticated theory, we may conclude that this theory embraces a 
certain degree of ontological doubt, as no reportage is permanently valid.    
 
Shklar, whose interest as a political theorist is to theorize normative orientation without 
preventing further revision of its underlying knowledge, advances Runciman’s emphasis on 
ontological doubt. Her political theory is grounded on the idea that people’s suffering from 
cruelty ‘here and now’ (Shklar, 1984: 249) is to produce relevant knowledge of what 
suffering ought to be publicly outlawed and not a philosophy of suffering which would 
produce a taxonomy or classification of suffering. Reporting acts of cruelty – understood as 
ordinary acts, not just extraordinary cruelties – leads to the knowledge of cruelty which 
aspires to provide full understanding of an event, within the limits of certainty outlined by 
Runciman. Because she seeks to formulate normative knowledge, Shklar needs a closure on 
the epistemic knowledge of suffering. Her political theory thus exemplifies what Stephen 
White calls ‘weak ontology’, which is an ontological position that continuously nurtures 
scepticism about the validity of its ontology. It ‘possesses resources for deflecting [the] 
propensity … to naturalization, reification, and unity’ (White, 2000: 8) while accepting that 
for the sake of action (or life), we also need to affirm certain meanings and act upon them.      
 
It is uncertain to what extent Shklar knew of her close affinity to the mid-century realists. A 
generation younger, she entered the profession at the time when bifurcation between political 
theory and social scientific study of politics was becoming firmly entrenched – Deutsch’s 
references to Morgenthau as a political theorist being a case in the point. Thus, we should not 
expect her to be commenting at length on the works of IR theorists. Yet, she was a close 
friend and colleague of Stanley Hoffmann and it is reasonable to surmise that it was 
Hoffmann who introduced Shklar to IR. For someone outside IR, she followed the IR realists 
redolently closely. As her papers disclose, she read all key books by Niebuhr and Morgenthau 
and assigned them to her students (Harvard University Archives, HUGFP 118). But whenever 
directly commenting on the realists’ ideas, she seeks to differentiate herself from them. Few 
books are closer to Shklar’s seminal critique of moralism and legalism (1964) than 
Morgenthau’s Scientific Man and Power Politics. Yet, she accuses him and other IR realists 
of imputing objectivist, ideological thinking in the name of national interest into their 
otherwise skeptical and anti-moralist theoretical framework. As a result, they keep national 
interest closed to moral scrutiny (Shklar, 1964: 125). 
 
Shklar worries that realists fail to write doubt into their ontology. Yet, Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr seem to be doing precisely this when producing moral analyses of their own time and 
ideal-types of international political practice. Like Shklar isolates suffering as an immediately 
negatively recognisable, ordinary experience among ‘us’, so does Morgenthau distinguish 
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national interest as an ordinarily recognised property of international relations. Like the 
cosmopolitan Shklar does not seek to reify the idea of us-versus-them, yet starts with the 
immediate ‘us’, so does Morgenthau use the ‘nation state’ as a heuristic device (Behr and 
Rösch, 2012: 39). In the absence of a robust ontology, Morgenthau necessitates that the world 
he wants to understand reveals itself to him – albeit in an imperfect manner. Morgenthau is 
more than aware of this imperfection. Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch illuminate this issue 
when they argue that Morgenthau’s concepts of power or interest should not be understood as 
‘ontological statements’ but as ‘epistemological concepts’. They helpfully quote from a letter 
Morgenthau wrote in 1961 to resist his likening to Heinrich Treitschke, whom he calls ‘an 
ideologue of the nation state … and of power’ (2012: 39, 40).  
I am an analyst of the nation state and of power and have emphasized time and again their 
negative moral connotations. More particularly, I have emphasized the obsolescence of the 
nation state as a principle of political order.  
Even if Morgenthau judges the nation state as obsolete, he nevertheless works with the 
concept to account for the behaviour that is done in the name of the nation state, which he 
recognises as weighty in his studied social sphere of action.  
 
There are multiple occasions at which a Weberian scholar like Morgenthau must correct and 
possibly also abandon his once-developed ideal-types. As Runciman emphasizes, ideal-
typical generalizations do not pre-empt explanation and evaluation of scientific knowledge 
claims (Runciman, 1983: 107). Neither do they disqualify Runciman’s hypothetical ‘rival 
observer’ who must ask over and again about the accuracy of the very act of reportage about 
the world. Is national interest still a concept practitioners use when trying to report about their 
own action? Classical realism depends on constant ‘reality checks’. Contemporary heirs of 
classical realism cannot fortuitously apply Morgenthau’s ideal-types without also examining 
the validity of these ideal-types for their own spatio-temporal situation. While realists cannot 
account for empirical reality being separated from the idea of this reality, their ontological 
uncertainty compels them to constantly revisit this idea of reality. The central notion of the 
ideal-type allows them to produce knowledge of the empirical world which has greater 
scientific validity than a simple aggregate of practitioners’ self-reporting utterances. In this 
sense, realism aspires to objectivity, which is objectivity of a kind. Behr and Rösch 
characterise it as ‘an analysis based upon explicitly formulated conceptual distinctions in 
order to perceive/find out/identify/recognize/analyze features and qualities of an object in 
question’ and not as ‘never-changing characteristics which would be knowable and 
describable on the basis of ever-valid, truthful sentences’ (2012: 43). This is the reason why 
Shklar calls Runciman’s social science the squaring of the hermeneutic circle.  
 
Normative judgment, which Turner and Mazur locate as intrinsically linked to the Weberian 
idea of separate social spheres, follows the very same principle of ontological doubt. Because 
she is more attentive to normative knowledge than factual, Shklar locates ontological doubt as 
only a property of the realm of values (and fails to recognise its role also in the realm of 
facts). At the same time, Shklar is instructive on how knowledge rooted in ontological doubt 
can have normative validity, as this is precisely what she examines. While postulating that 
criteria of moral behaviour must be developed locally, she nevertheless supports an idea of 
weak cosmopolitan ethics and burdens those who have the capacity to act ethically to do so. 
This is because we do not have complete understanding of the facts of life as lived by others, 
especially when it comes to the perceptions and causes of their suffering. Instead of letting 
people suffer until such knowledge is established, Shklar proposes to act on what I call 
‘borrowed knowledge’ (Stullerova, 2013: 693). For instance, she champions human rights, the 
purpose of which is to judge and act in situations where there are signs of human suffering, 
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without instantly necessitating a reliable reportage, description and evaluation of the situation. 
All those will follow, as will better understanding of the norm of human rights, which, for 
Shklar has to be open to – infrequent – change in response to the knowledge of their use.  
 
Shklar’s, and Aron’s, censure of classical realist social science comes from their worries that 
it is not sufficiently sceptical about the validity of its ideal-types. Levine quotes Deutsch as 
making a similar point. Deutsch cautions that Morgenthau is saved from a ‘hangman’ walking 
behind him, saying ‘I am the action of your theories’, because ‘he knows far too much 
history’ (Levine, 2013: 102–3). This is a justified worry that anyone working in the classical 
realist tradition must be prepared to face. Like a circle cannot really be squared, so will there 
always be a tension between the scientific relevance of realist knowledge of the world and 
ontological uncertainty about the very basis of this science. Only continuous scholarship can 
guard from this critique, which will always have reason to exist. Analyticist social science 
must cultivate its inner critic. Judgment is both an activity of critique and an activity of 
positive knowledge production. It becomes normative when the inner critic is temporarily 
silenced as all explanatory alternatives look inferior in the light of presently available 
knowledge of the world. Then a situation can be judged as normatively welcome or 
problematic, or such judgment can be projected onto the future. This is precisely where 
judgment informs policy recommendation – and classical realism lends itself well to both. 
Those who consider as normative only the type of knowledge that transcends all spatio-
temporal situatedness might be wary of using this term (and resort to ‘practice-informing 
theory’, as Turner and Mazur do, instead). For others, most notably Shklar and Morgenthau, 
this is the only normative knowledge to be had. The validity of this knowledge is affected by 
the same doubt as is scientific ontology of the empirical inquiry that accompanies it, but this 
is not a reason to despair. Rather, it is a reason for investing in its continuous cultivation, 
correction and critique. 
 
Conclusion 
Applying Jackson’s characteristics to critical IR (reflexivity) and classical realism 
(analyticism), we may conclude that what differentiates the two is disagreement about the 
possibility to ‘transcend experience’, a belief that there is a ‘possibility of going beyond the 
facts to grasp the deeper processes and factors that generate those facts’ (Jackson, 2011: 36–
7). Critical IR is affirmative on this, while classical realism does not find this position 
possible. As a result, classical realists do not worry about potential reification of meaning by 
the virtue of their inescapably limited, reductionist and what might be termed ‘populist’ ideal-
types. While never fully objective, the faculty of judgment employed at all stages of scientific 
inquiry is the best tool to be had. In turn, realists are sceptical about any classification of the 
empirical world that does not stem from reporting on that world and imposes categories 
developed out of one’s political persuasion. Critical IR’s focus on the ‘margin’ is a good 
example. Can we be sure of the margin, if the very act of speaking about it makes the 
marginal enter the mainstream? For realists, this ontological move is too ‘thick’. While 
sharing a great deal, classical realism differs from critical IR precisely on the issue of 
ontological doubt and the role scientific engagement with empirical reality has in addressing 
this doubt.  
 
Levine (2013) is right; Morgenthau was not a critical theorist. But this does not mean he 
miscarried his own scientific and ethical aspirations, as Levine suggests. ‘A constant 
grappling against theory by the means of theory’, which Levine (101, emphasis mine) 
demands from Morgenthau, is not to be had. The self-correcting mechanism, which critical IR 
calls ‘doublethink’, finds its parallel in classical realism’s ontological doubt and concomitant 
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epistemological work. It is represented in the never-ending quest to make sense of empirical 
reality, which constantly escapes it, while also slowly appropriating the corrective meanings 
and normative interventions produced by realist scholarship in its intertwined but also 
separable scientific and normative modes. We may say that classical realism engages in 
constant grappling against theory by the means of social science. Due to its purposeful 
ontological weakness, classical realism is not as easily translatable to present context as are 
some ontologically robust theories. Indeed, current careful engagement with classical realist 
texts discloses that any such translation must be rooted in contextual interpretation. What also 
needs to be examined, this article has sought to argue, are the knowledge claims on the basis 
of which the mid-century realists made their scientific and normative statements. Due to their 
inherently limited spatio-temporal validity, they must be deemed ‘borrowed knowledge’ until 
we develop knowledge for our own context, also via understanding of its own history, or 
establish that knowledge produced in different contexts is valid and is the best knowledge to 
be had.   
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